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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the role played by institutions in labaur markets and their effects on 
labour Qutcomes are presented. The results show that, frrst, the flexible and rigid labour 
market models do not exit, instead, there are intennediate labour rnarket models. 
Secand, many features of the labour market, usually viewed as serious rigidities, have 
slight impact on unemployment. And finally, a wide range of Jabour market institutions 
have cumulative effects on unemployment and employrnent creatian, wmch can be 
amplified under specific combinatían of institutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article offers a study of the role played by institutions of ¡abour market across the 
mast developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEeD) couotdes 
and their effects 00 unemployment and employment creation. The results presented show that 
(1) the flexible and figid labour market models do not exist, instead, there are intennediate 
¡abour market functioning models, (2) many characteristics of the labour market that are 
popularly viewed as serious rigidities have slight impact 00 unemployment and (3) a wide 
range of labour market institutions have cumulative effeet 00 unemployrnent and employrnent 
creation, which can be amplified under specific combination of institutions, so high degree of 
wage bargaining together Active Labour Market PoJicies (ALMP). 
The regulatory enviromnent and/or institutional arrangements exist and can affeet the 
clearing function of the labour market in several ways. The detraetors consider the labour 
market as any other produets' market in which the same rules for price and quantity 
determination in competitive markets must be applied. In this context, the role played by 
institutions is to weak the demand for labour, making it less attractive to hire a worker by 
explicitly pushing up the wage cost or by introducing a negative shadow price for labour and, 
also, to disturb the ¡abour supply by impairing the equilibrating function of the market 
mechanism adjustment between warkers' and enterprises' decisions within an efficient market. 
From this perspective, the high level of rigidity ofthe European labour markets is the majn 
reasan of the high unemployment rates of these countries (e.g. Siebert, 1997). Therefore, the 
key~pojnt to fight against unemployment is to make the labour markets more flexible, 
especially in ÉUrop~ (e.g. OECD, 1 994b, and European Commission, 1994). 
On the contrary, the upholders indicate that it must not forget sorne key torces in 
determining ¡abour market behaviour, such as power and social relationships, custom and 
faimess (e.g. Adnett, 1996). This perspective contains a very diverse group, e.g. the labour 
market segmentation theory (Diekens and Lang, 1992), the insider~outsider model (Snower, 
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1989), etc., pays mueh attention to custom and praetice in the labour market. The purported 
weakness of market forees in most sectors óf the ¡abour market leads this approach to 
emphasise the importance of internal, firm-specific factors in wage and employment 
determination and to view persisting unemployment as a normal feature of unregulated labour 
markets. The economic agents interacting in labour markets require biases to defend their 
economic and power position, which justifies the existence of regulations that acquire different 
characteristics and justifications depending on the reference country. 
Intennediate positions defend that sorne institutional characteristics of labour markets, 
aboye al1 in Europe, pennit to sustain high levels of unemployment but many others so~called 
rigidities have no observable impact on unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996 and Nickell, 1997). 
The results described in the present job encompass these previous cross-country studies 
comparing labour market perfonnance. They also offers new insights: (1) the construction of a 
rigidity index which summarises the diversity of labour market models functioning across the 
most developed OECD, against the tradítional idea of rigid versus flexible labour market 
1l10dels. And (2) an empirical evaluation of the institutional influence on the evolution of 
unemployment and the employability whieh shows that the cumulative effects of the 
institutions are higher than the individual ones and that certain combinations of institutions are 
less damaging than others. 
TraditionalIy, studies on the impact of legal regulations on ¡abour market processes 
focus on wage or status attainment, as outcome variables, considering that institutional 
structures and ¡abour regulations do not change over longer periods of time. However, this 
perspeetive has been challenged by frequent attempts to use ¡abour law reform as an instrument 
of ¡abour market poliey (Rogowski and Schooman, 1996). Given this use, the present job can 
not omit sorne general recommendations of economic poliey oriented, not to the absence of a11 
institutional rigidity, but to the combination of institutions that can be better adapted to the 
socio-economic characteristies of the labour markets of the countries considered. It is also 
remarkable that, a\though most eeonomists make the institutions of the ¡abour markets 
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responsible for the high and persistent unemployment in Europe, the recommendations of 
tlexibility can be political1y accepted in sorne countries and not io others (Saint-Paul, 1996). 
This article Is organised as foUows. Section 2 describes the maio characteristics of the 
institutions which regulate the labour market. Section 3 presents the construction of a rigidity 
index and the results obtained from it interpretation. Section 4 offers the empirical analysis of 
relationships between the rigidities considered and the labour market outcomes studied. FinaIly, 
Section 5 summarises the conclusions. Also, Annex: Variables contains the description and 
sources of the variables. 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOVR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
The description of the institutions which regulate the ¡abour markets aIlows us (l) to 
delimit and facilitate the theoretical and empirical treatment of the set of variables known as 
institutional variables, (2) to discuss their potentíal effects on the supply and demand of 
employment and, therefore, on unemployment and job creation, and (3) to discover the 
different institutional characteristics of the labour markets of the OECD countries studied. 
The Direct Measurements of the level of rigidity of the ¡abour markets are the 
Employment Protection (EP) and Labour Standards (LS), which summarise the Iegislation 
about hiring and dismissal costs and working conditions, respectively. Among other authors, 
Saint-Paul (!996) offers a pessimístic view of the effect of these variables on the evolution of 
employment. SpecificaIly, he sbows us that the institutional rigidities are determined by the 
interests of the insiders, wbo are more numerous and better organised than the outsiders. 
Furthermore, he shows that the reforms geared towards a greater flexibility are carried out 
when they are easier to seU to the insiders and that the tightening of legislatioo occurs when 
unemployment is increasing and economic growth is decreasing. However, these regulations do 
not only generate negative effects, because if employrnent is very protected, companies have 
incentives for investing in the specific training and recycling oftheir human capital. 
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Tbe institutions in charge of Unemployment Treatment are essentially focused on 
Benefit Duration (BD), whieh indicates the duration in years of unemployment benefit. 1t 
inereases the potentíal workers' shadow price, the minimum wage for whieb be would aceept a 
job offer. so the Benefit Replacement Rate (BRR) (Layard el al, 1994 and Nickell, 1997), 
although tbere are exceptions; e.g. Sweden has a high replacement rate, around 80%, together 
with a relatively short unemployment benefit duration, 1.2 years. Tbese factors unduly reduce 
the intensity ofjob search, ¡nerease the duration ofunemployment, weaken the pressure ofthe 
unemployed to accept suitable job offers, and prevent adjustment of lowest wages. 
Benefit systems can cause two types of labour market problems (OECD, 1996b and 
1997c). The first Is the "unemployment trap" which occurs when benefits are high compared 
with expected incomes when working. Cutting benefits to the unemployed would increase tbe 
reward to taking a job but the social costs of tbis solutioo may be unacceptable. And the second 
is the "poverty trap" which appears when incremental increases in earnings or income lead to 
withdrawal of benefits and higher tax payments, so people on low incomes receiving benefits 
are discouraged from additional effort. 
Furthermore, the Tax System may cause a third problem on labour markets. High 
labour costs may increase its cost and reduce employment. In particular, tax payments and 
social security contríbutions for those on low eamings are high, raising the eost of labour, 
discouraging biring and stifling entrepreneursbip, (OECD, 1995a and 1997c). A good measure 
of the tax burden wbich is likely to influence the labour market is the Total Tax Rate (TTR) 
(social security contributions and other indirect costs paid by employers and social 
contributions and taxes on pay levíed on employees). Althougb this variable discourages supply 
and demand of work, its effect on unemployment and job creation cannot be easily isolated, 
because there exist soeio-political objeetives whicb, depending on the cOllntry in question, may 
reqllire high social contributions from workers and employers in order to maintain the validity 
ofthe unemployment benefit systems. Hence, most policy reforms oftaxes and benefits involve 
trade-offs between financia! and social costs. 
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The asymmetry between countries is important with regard to ALMP. Sorne countries 
show a higher level of commitment than others with regard to this activity and spend more 011 
placement and advice services, training ofthe adult unemployed and direct creation of jobs and 
hiring subsidies. This is particularly true ofEuropean countries as opposed to the United States 
aod Japan.lt may distinguished two components: (1) Subsidised Employrnent and Measures for 
the Disabled (APS) encourage employment creation, especially al' less skilled workers, by 
reducing theÍr relative cost. However it is likely to segment the labour market and to induce 
substitution effects (subsidised workers replacing non-subsidised workers). (2) Training 
Programs and Youth Measures (APe) aim at enhancing employability prospects but they have 
not proved to be effective ¡fthey are open to all unemployed and not targeted to specific labour 
market needs. 
Unemployment also depends on the institutions which determine the wages and on the 
extent to which they are dominated by the insiders, i.e. on Collective Bargaining. In Europe, the 
unions intervene extensively in the process of establishing wages, although the proportion of 
union labour, Union Density (UD), began to decrease in most El/ropean countries in the 1980's, 
especial1y in the United Kingdom and France, the latter with average rates of abont 9.5% in the 
1990's. However, the workers who earn wages covered by a collective bargaining, Union 
Coverage Rate (UC), represent more than 75% in most European countries, whereas the United 
States and Japan maintain the lowest rates. These variables are complemented by the level of 
Co-ordination (CO) and Centralisation (CE) ofthe wage bargaining, i.e. whether the unions and 
the employers adopt the same positlon in the wage bargaining and whether this results io 
national, sectoral or
l 
company~level agreements. Although wage bargaining operates in a very 
centralised manner with multisectoral nationa! agreements in the Nordic countries and in 
Austria, unisectoral agreernellts are reached in the European Union, with wide divergences 
among countries depending on their level of co-ordination, e.g. in Germany, ao agreement in 
one sectOr lays down the gllideline for the rest, whereas in the United Kingdom, the sectoral 
agreements are not very important and there is little discussion abont the existing wage. In 
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Australia and New Zealand, the fixing ofbasic wages is centralised, unlike in the United States 
and Canada, where most oftlle wages aTe established at the discretion ofthe employers. 
This general view ofthe institutiollS in the labour markets seerns to suggest that neither 
complete flexibility Ilor complete rigidity is appropriate as the sole deterrnining factor of the 
evolutio11 of the labonr markets. In reality, a trade-off takes place in each conntry, because a 
certain degree of rigidity stabilises employment and income at the expense of a rapid 
adjustment to the change, whereas a high level of flexibiJity allows a rapid and efficient 
adjnstment in return for a11 increase in the volatility ofwages and higher risk ofunemployment. 
It is important to note that sorne combinations of institutions affect unemployment and 
employment creation in the same direction, so high firing costs and high unemployment benefit 
duration, which induce strong disincentives for labour demand (finns do not hire) and labour 
supply (employees do not Iook for work. In other combinations, however, the effect of Olle 
institution is contrary to the other' s so ALMP and high unemployment benefits, since the 
former increases employability but the latter induces low incentives to apply it. This suggests 
that labour market institutions are not independent in their working (Coe and Snower, 1997). 
3. A RIGIDITY INDEX 
It is customary to divide labour markets ¡nto a simple dichotomy of flexible and rigid. 
However, the one-by-one exploration of the labour market institutions carried out in the 
previous section shows that there are different levels of institutional rigidity, and also offers 
results which are not definitive with regard to the effect of the institutions on the ¡abour 
markets. That is to say, the United States' flexible model and Europe's rigid mode! do not exist. 
Instead, there are intermediate labour market functioning models which extend the typology of 
countries. In order to represent this perception, an index for the institutional rigidities has been 
constructed, divided into Direct Rigidity (represented by EP), Unemployrnent BeneDt 
úepresented by BD), ALMP, CoIlective Bargaining (represented by the UD, UC, CO, CE 
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average) and Tax System (represented by TTR) and, also, an index which summarises the 
institutional rigidity in ¡abour markets (arithmetical mean ofthe other five índices) (Table 3.1). 
These iodices are coostructed on the basis of homogeneous criteria over time and have 
ordinal value across the countries considered (these are arranged according to the degree of 
rigidity of their labollr markets). For constructing a rigidity index, the range of values of a 
institutional variable is divided into four categories. The level of rigidity which each category 
represents is: 1 (low), 2 (medium-low), 3 (medium-high) and 4 (high), so the rigidity index 1s 
ranked from I to 4. For example, the values of BD, that goes from 0.5 to 4, are divided into 
four closed intervals represented by one of the four possible values of the index, [0.5, 1] = 1. 
[1.5, 2J = 2, [2.5, 3] "" 3 and [3.5, 4J := 4. In the case of ALMP, the level of rigidity is 
understood to be higher the less money the country in question invests in this type ofpolicy 
lt is true that the non-European countries, with the United States at the top of the list 
(index 1.6, the lowest of aH the countries considered), show a lower level of institutional 
rigidity in their labour markets than European countries. But among the latter, the importance 
of the five groups of ¡abour market illstitutions considered varies substantially from one 
country to another. For example, Gennany has a much more significant investment in active 
policies than Spain, although both have a similar level of institutional rigidity in their labour 
markets (index 3.2) or Portugal and Netherlands (index 2.6) have identical total index but 
significant differences with respect to the duration of unemployrnent benefits. 
Collective Bargaining is crucial to the functioning of the labour markets. Except for the 
United States and Canada, this institution presents a medium-high or high index (3 or 4) in 
most countries, a symptom of the eonfidence instilled by the agreement among the economic 
agents aimed at fighting unemployment. 
It is relevant note that the majority of the European eountries, although present 
medium-high or high level of rigidity in their labour markets, have a brief variety of 
unemployment rates. This faet is surumarises in Table 3.2 (rigidity is represented by the rigidity 
labour markets index presented in Table 3.1, and Unemployment is described byan index 
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constructed by a similar way than the rigidíty index), where not al! the countries considered are 
in the main diagonal (Jt would be the result if the higher rigidity level was the higher 
unemployment was). 
The two extremes, United States as example of flexible labour market (index 1.6 and 
unemployment rate 6.3%) and Spain a rigid one (index 3.2 and unemployrnent rate 20.4) are 
representative of the negative relation between institutions and unemployment. However, most 
countries have an average unemployment rate of between 4% and 11% for the 1983-1997 
period, regardless of the level of rigidity of their labour contractual legislation, an observation 
which corroborates the results obtained by Nickell (1997). In fact, a group of countries presents 
low unemployrnent rates with both high and low rigidity levels, such as Austria (index 3.2 and 
unemployment rate 4.5) or Japan (index 2.2 and unemployment rate 2.7). And also, high 
unemployment rates are compatible with medium rigidity levels, so Italy (index 3.0 and 
unemployment rate 9.1) or Netherlands (index 2.6 and unemployment rate 8.1). 
An important idea is derived from all these facts, unemployment io some European 
countries is not produced directly by rigidity, but it seems to be caused by the inadequate 
application of institutional regulations. Hence, the next step is to attempt to discover the 
combinations of institutions with higher impact on unemployment andjob creation. 
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Table 3.1: Rigidity Iabour markets index 
4. EVALUATING LABOUR MARKET RIGIDITY 
Oireet Uoemployment Active labour CoUeative fax Rigidity Total 
Rigidity Beoefit Market PoIides 8argaining System Index unemployment 
(1-4) (1-4) (1·4) (1-4) (H) (1.4) (%) 4.1 Variables, data and metbodology 
8elgium , 
" 
10.4 
Austria , 4 
" 
4.5 
Germany , 4 , ,., 
" 
The main aim of this job is to verifY and evaluate empirically relationships of labour 
France , 4 
" 
10.7 
Ireland 4 ,., 14.5 
Spaln 4 , ,., 20.4 
market institutions with target outcome variables to explain, unemployment and employment 
Flnland , , 4 ,., 10.6 
Ilaly , , 
" 
,., creation. In order to achieve this aim, linear regression models are constructed where the 
Sewden 4 ,., 5.' 
Norway , 
" 
4.' 
UK 4 
" " 
endogenous variables are Total Unemployment Rate, Short-tenn Unemployment Rate, Long-
Portugal , 
" " Netherlands , 
" " Dsnmar\<. 
" " 
term Unemployment Rate and Employment/Population Ratio, respectively, and the explanatory 
Australia ,., ,., 
New Zealand , .. 5.' variables are institutional and economic (definition and sources, Annex). 
Japao 4 
" " Switzerlaod , LO ,., 
Canada , LO 
" 
The institutional explanatory variables are divided into the five types described in 
US , 
" 
5.' Section 2: (1) Direct Rigidities (type A) is represented only by EP because the high correlation 
between EP and LS, (2) Unemployment Treatment (type B) is represented by BD and BRR, (3) 
Table 3.2: Typology of countries 
ALMP (type e) and APS (type e2) are represented by instrumental variables, ALMP* and 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
H I • I -- APS*, respectively. Because ALMP and APS refer to percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
H Spain I Belgium Gennany I All5tria i I 
lreland I France i 
I 
, 
Rnland I N""" 
• 
I 
I !taly I 
_ffi 
R1GIDITY ! United Kingdom 
(GDP) normalised on current unemployment, these variables are endogenous. So, cOllsidering 
unemployrnent rates, ít ís renormalised the current percentage of GDP spent on ALMP and APS 
011 the unemployment rate in 1979 to create tile instrllments. With respect to 
¡ Denmar\<. Portugal Japan 
I Australia I 
employment/poplllatioJ1 ratio, ALMP and APS are instrumented as mentioned. (4) Collective 
I 
NewZealand Nelhellands I 
-- I Canada United States SWitzerland 
Bargaining (type D) is represented by UD, UC, CO and CE. Finally (5) Tax System (type E) ls 
represented by TTR because of analogous reason as described for Direct Rigidities. 
The economic explanatory variables are ehange in Inflation (1) and Cyc1e. The total 
sample period, 1983-97, is divided ¡nto three cross-sections dated 1983-88, 1989~94 Y 1995-97, 
that can be qualified as ofeconomic expansion, recessíon and economic recovery, respectively. 
So in order to estimate the effect of the economic cyc1e on target outcome variables, two 
dummies are defined for 1983-88 and 1989-94, respectively. 
The data available are structured in a panel, so the regression models are estimated 
using generalised least squares procedure, considering heterocesdaticity and AR(I) stochastic 
structure form the error termo It must be taking into account two limitations of this 
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methodology. The results obtained offer a he!pfu! overview ofthe correlations in the data, but 
without considering possible feedback. And the environment of the analyses 1S partia!, because 
there may be factors (social, politica! aml/or cultural) that explain cross-country differences in 
unemployment and job creation that are not associated with the labour market. 
4.2 Description oC resuUs 
The estimated regression models (Tables 4.1-4.4, it 1S presented only the combinations 
of institutions with higher impact 00 uoemployment aod employment creation) offer the 
following information: 
I Estimated effects of combinations of labour market institutions. The purpose 1S to 
estimate the overaH effect of different combinations of institutions, eonsidering groups of two, 
three, four and five types ofinstitutions considered, respectively. The following information can 
be taken out of this application: (1) which groups of institutions seem to be the ones with the 
largest potentíal effect 011 the endogenous variables, and (2) given a combination, which 
marginal impact is produced by including one more type of institution (comparing the adjusted 
R2 obtained from the two estimated models, without and witb the last type ofinstitution). 
2. Estimated parameters for eaeh combination, with their standard deviation in 
parentheses. AII the estimated parameters related to institutional variables are statistically 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels. In addition, a sensitivity analyses (Levine and Renelt, 
1992) is applied in order to detect the most robust relationships. The economic variables are 
always included in the regressions and do not affect the robustness of the estimated parameters 
for the in~titutiollal variables. 
3. Interpretation of the estimated parameters: (1) it is applied the logarithm 
transformation (In) to each endogenolls variable, hence if the right-hand side of the regression 
model increases by 0.6, In unemployment goes up by 0.6, so unemployment rises by just over 
20 percent. For example, from a baseline unemployment rate of 5 percent, this would represent 
an increase of one percentage point to 6 percent. (2) All the models include a constant terro, so 
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the parameters associated with the two dummies can be interpreted as the difference from the 
e mo e s) 00 endogenous variables, of the effect of the reeovery phase (not included ,'n th d 1 
expansion and recession phases, respectively. 
4.3 Interpretation of results 
The quantification ofthe effects ofthe labour market institutions on unemployment and 
c lve argammg, job creation reveals three important results. The most immediate 1S that Colle t' B .. 
Unemployment Treatment and ALMP are the most influential institutions in relation to 
unemploYIOent and, to a les ser extent, in relation to the employment/population ratio. The most 
general result, which confirms that the institutions have eumulative effects, indicates that partial 
reforms which only affeet one type of institution achieve less significant reductions in 
unemployment than overall reforIOs which affeet all ofthem. And the most specifie result, from 
which employment poliey recommendations may be extracted, shows that eertain combinations 
of institutions have more effeet than others on unemployment and employment rates. 
Laws relating to EP (mise the cost of employrnent adjustment) will almost certainly 
reduce short-term unemployment, via the reduced inflows, and raise long~tenn unemployment, 
via the reduced outflow. So the overall impaet on unemployment is likely to be rather small or 
null, as tbese effeets tend to cancel out. 
In the short tenn, no effeet on unemployment would be expected from Beoefit Duration 
(Nickell, 1997). However, the iocrease in the social and/or economic benefit period may (1) 
encourage employed people eaming very precarious wages to ¡eave their job, by raising their 
replacement rates, thus increasing short-term unemployment, and (2) discourage the 
unemployed more in the short term than the long term, by inereasing the period of time which 
., y ralsmg ong-term they have to look for a possibly better job In any case this may beended b .' 1 
unemployment, a larger influence on which is aetually observed. 
The most effectíve ALMP are those whieh offer economic support (APS), although they 
do not encourage the unemployed to actively seek work. This result is not due to the fact that 
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the proportion of public expenditure allocated to active policies in the labour market and 
invested in the training and recycling of human capital (an average of 47% during the 1983-97 Table4.1: 
Regressions to explain Total Unemployment Rate Percentage 
period) is much less than that spent on suhsidising the unemployed. The cause is to be found in 
COmbinalions of labour rna!ket institulions (types 8, C2, D and E} 
S D SD SC2D BC2DE 
8RR (%) 0.019 (0.003) 0.012 (0.004) 0.017 (0.004) 0.010 (0.004) 
BD (0-4) 0.36(0.05) 0.19{0.05) 0.18(0.04) 0.20(0.04) the imbalance between the training acquired by potential workers Uob supply) and the 
requirements of employers Gob demand). It is therefore advisable that this type of policy be 
AlMP' (%) 
APS (%) -0.17(0.04) -0.16(0.03) 
UC (",(,) 1.00(0.10) 0.97 (0.17) 0.61 (0.15) 0.54(0.15) 
geared towards reducing this imbalance. CO (2-6) -0.17(0.06) -0.16(0.06) -0.21 (0.05) -0.21 (0.04) 
CE (1-3) -0,52 (0.24) -0.54(0.22) -0.41 (0.19) 
Collective Bargaining is crucial in order to explain the evolution of unemployment and TTR (%) 0.026 (0.006) 
(%) -0.093 (0.030) ·0.039 (0.026) -0.027 (0.025) -0.039 (0.015) -0.034 (0.019) 
Dummy foc 83--86 -0.54 (0.22) -0.26(0.19) -0.31 (0.17) -0.34 (0.15) -0.10(0.07) 
Dummy- for 89-94 ·0.23 (0.21) -0.19(0.18) -0.21 (0.16) -0.18(0.14) -0.15 (0.08) 
employment creation, which is not greatly affected by the rest of the variables. Although in the 
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.08 0.20 0.39 0.53 0.64 
T (counlries.lime) 60 (20. 3) 60(20,3) 60 (20, 3) 60 (20, 3) 60(20,3) 
long term only the level of co-ordination among employers and among unions seems to be 
important, the level of coverage and the level of centralisation of the wage agreements produce 
greater variations in the total shorHerm unemployment and in the employment rateo Among the Table 4.2: Regressions to explain Short-term Unemployment Rate Percentage 
group of countrles studied, where the average union coverage rate is 65% together with an Combi~OIlS of labour market inslitufions (lypes: 8, C2, D and El 
D E DE BDE BC2DE ABC2DE 
EP (120) ,0.024 (0.010) 
BRR (%) 0.ü10(0'cJ04) 0.014 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003) average unjon density of 42%, it is not surprising that the ¡atter variable has a neutral effect 00 
BD (Q.4) 0.16 (0.04) 0.16(0.04) 0.14(0.04) 
AlMP' (%) the unemployment rates and very little effect on the employment/population ratio. 
APS ,%) -0.15 (0.03) -0.14(0.03) 
The tax burden negatively affects the three unemployment rates, although its effect is UC (%) 0.92 (0.18) 0.60(0.10) 0046 (0.15) 0.35(0.13) 0.45(0.14) 
ca (2-6) -0.11 (0.05) ·0.17 (0.05) .{l.17{0.05) -0.20 (0.04) .{l.16 (0.04) 
CE (1-3) -0.30(0.25) -0.58(0.22) -0.78 (0.20) -0.52(0.16) -0.46 (0.17) 
ITR (%) 0.031 (0.002) 0.034 (0.007) 0.031 (0.007) 0.029 (O.O06) 0.027 (0.006) 
sma!! as compared with that ofthe aforementioned institutions. lt does not playa very important 
,%) -0.010 (0.007) -0.044 (0.024) -0.036 (0.023) -0.033 (0.021) -0.021 (0.011) -0.031 (0.018) 
Dummy for 8J.86 ·0.038 (0010) -0.028 (0.017) -0.24(0.17) -0.29 (0.15) -0.28(0.14) ·0.25 (0.13) 
role in determining long-term unemployment and the employment rate, with respect to which it 
Dummy for 89-94 -0.023 (0.017) ·0.16(0.15) -0.28 (0.15) -0.19(0.14) -0.13 (0.09) ·0.34 (0.12) 
Adjusted R2 (%) O'" 0.05 0.24 0.40 0.59 0.60 
T (counlries,lirne) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3} 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 
does not form part of the combination of institutions which has the greatest cumulative effects. 
lt should only be pointed out that, together with Collective Bargaining, it is the institution which 
has the largest influence on the short~term unemployment rateo 
lt is worth highlighting the fact that two of the institutions which generate high levels of 
rigidity in the labour market, EP and BD, constitute the most influential combination of 
institutions with reg~rd to long-term unemploymeot. Therefore, the frequently denounced 
harrnful effect of these rigidities 00 long-term unemployment has its empirica! justification. 
However, when three types of institution are combined, the active policies become the 
counterweight to the previous ones. This suggests a reform which would make contractual 
legislation more flexible and channel the public funds invested in active policles towards an 
adjustment of the job supply and demando 
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Table 4.3: Regressions ta cxplain Long*term Unemployment Rate Perccntage 5. CONCLUSIONS 
Combinatlons of labour market institl.ltiOl1s (types: A. B. C2, D and E) 
o E DE 8DE 8C2DE ABe2DE The European labour markets hide a wide diversity with respect to both labour market 
EP (120) 
-0.024 (0.010) 
BRR (%) 0.010 (0.004) 0.014 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003) institutions and the rigidities induced by them, and unemployment and employment ereation 
80 (0-4) 0.16 (0.04) 0.16(0.04) 0.14(0.04) 
ALMP' (%) Furthermore, the differences within Europe are much greaterthan are the difference between the 
APS (%) 
-0.15(0.03) -0.14(0.03) 
ca (2.-B) 
-0.11 (0.05) -0.17 (0.05) -0.17 ((1.O5) -0.20 (0.04) -0.16 (O.04) 
CE (1-3) 
-0.30(0.25) .j).58 (0.22) ·0.78 (0.20) -0.52(0.18) -0.46 (0.17) European average and North America . 
TIR (%) 0.031 (0.002) 0.034 (0.007) 0.031 (0.007) 0.029 (O.OOO) 0.027 (O.OO6) 
1(%) 
-0.010 (0.007) ·0.044 (0.024) -0.036 (O.023) -0.033 (0.021) .. (1.021 (0.011) ·0.031 (0.018) Rigidity does not imply, per se, high or persistent unemployment. It is shown "that the 
Dummy for 83-88 -0.038 (DOtO) -o.D28 (O.OI7) _0.24 (0.17) .{l.29 (0.15) -0.28 (0.14) -0.25 (O.13) 
DJmmy tor 8S.94 
-0.023 (0.017) -0.16 (Q15) -0.26 (O.15) -0.19 (O.14) .{).13 (0.09) -0.34(0.12) European labour market is rigid, so it has high unemployment" is not adjusted to the empirica1 
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.40 0.56 0.60 
T (countlies, time) 60(20,3) 60 (20, 3) 60(20.3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) J reality, and that many characteristics of the labour market that are popularly viewed as serious 
rigidities have slight impact on lInemploymellt. In fact, high overall taxes, striet employment 
Table 4.4: Regressions to explain EmploymentlPopulation Ratio 
protection legislation, high unionisation and high benefit replacement rates apply no more to 
Combioations Qf Jabour market iflStitutions (types: A, B, C, O arld E) 
A o AD ABO ABDE ASCOE this high~unemployment group than they do to the low-unempJoyment group. This means that 
EP (1-20) 
-0.14 (0.03) .0.15(0.03) .0.18(0.03) .0.17 (0.07) .0.17 (0.03) 
BO (0-4) .0.17 (0.08) .0.17 (0.09) -0.17(0.09) labour market rigidities do not genemte negative effects on unemployment due to fact of 
ALMP'" (%) 0.oa6 (0.042) 
UD (%) 0.029 (0.007) 0.020 (0.006) 0.014 (0.006) 0.016 {0.007} 0.015 (O.OO7) existing, but they may become responsible for high unemployrnent due to its inadequate use. 
UC (%) 
-0.99 (0.30) ..{).a3 (O.34) "{).71 (0.37) 
-0.67 (0.38) -0.65 (0.38) 
ca (2-6) 0.27(0.11) 0.49{O.11) 0.41 {O. 10) 0,41 {O. 10) 0.41 (0.10) 
CE (1-3) 0.89(0.41) 0.90(0.40) 0.80(0.44) 
A wide range of labour market institlltions have cumulative effects on unemployment 
TTR (%) .0.079 (0.014) -0.060 (0.014) 
J (%) ·0.035 (0_015) -0.056 (0.028) -0.058 (0.043) .0.017 (0.003) -0.023 (0.014) ·0.021 (0.013) and employment creation. In particular, the unemployment effect of each institution is greater 
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.43 OA4 0.46 
T (countries, ¡¡me) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 60(20,3) 00(20,3) when it is impJemented in conjunetion with other institutiolls than in isolation. This 
aceumulated effect can be amplifíed under specific combinations of institutions, emphasising 
the combination of high degree of Collective Bargaining with Active Labour Market PoJicies. 
Thís indicates that partíal reforms which only affect one type of institution achieve less 
significant reductions in unemployrnent than overall reforms which affect all of them. 
Finally, given the diversity of ¡abour market institutions and poJicies across OECD 
countries, in particular European countries, and the variety of refonns already impJemented, it 
seems to be clear that the set of poliey measures comprising fundamenta! labour market reform 
will differ trom country to eountry. Tllat ¡s, the relevant mnge of to refonn in conjunction 
depends cfllcially on the countries' institutional structnre. 
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ANNEX:VARIABLES 
Total Unemployment Rate (TUR): stanclardised rates; per cent oftotallabour force. 
Sources: Nickell (1997), Table 1. And OECD (1996a), Tables L and 1.3. 
Long-term Unemployrnent Rate (LUR): stanclardised rates; per cent of total labour force. 
The long-term is defined as a duration of more than ayear. 
Sources: Nickell (1997), rabie 1, And OECD (1996a), Tables L, Q and 1.3. 
Short-term Unemployment Rate (SUR): difference between TUR and LUR. 
Employment/Population Ratio (EPR): ratio of employed persons to the total working-age population 
Source: OECD (1997a), Table B. 
Employrnent Protection (EP): index based on tbe degree of rigidity of the legal framework governing 
hiring and firing.1t is ranked from 1 to 20, with 20 being the most striet legislation. 
Sauree: OECD (1994b), Table 6.7. 
Labour Standards (LS): synthetie index referred to the legislation goveming a number ofaspeets ofthe 
labour market. lt is ranked from O (Iax or nO legislation) to lO (striet legislation), on eaeh of the five 
dimensions: working time, fixed-tenn eontraets, employment protection, mínimum wages and employees' 
representation rights (on works couneils, company boards and the like). 
Source: OECD (1994e), Table 4.8. 
Benefit Replacement Rate (BRR): average of gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two 
fami1y situations with average eamings in work. These rates does not take into aecount of taxation, 
benefits to ehildren, social assistance, employment-eonditional transfers or housing benefits; percentage 
of gross eamings. 
Saurces: Nickel! (1997), Table 4. And OECD (1997e), Table 2. 
Benefit Duration (8D): the majar benefit transitions which an unemployed person will face over an 
eight-year spell of unemployment (unemployment insurance, assistance benefit). It is ranked from O to 4, 
with 4 heing unlimited duration. 
Saurces: Layard el al. (1994), Table 5. Nicke]\ (1997), Table 4. And OECn (1996b), Fig. 2.3. 
Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP): expenditures for active lahour market prograrnmes per 
unemp10yed person relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in per eent): 
ALMP = (ALMPex/U) / (GDP/Pop) 
ALMPex: expenditures on active 1abonr market programmes . 
.'lources: OECD (1988, 1995b and 1996b), Tables 3.1 and T 
U: total registered unemployed. 
Saurces: OECD (1989, 1994e and 1995b), Tables 1 and T 
Pop: working age population. 
Saurces: OECD (1989, 1994a and 1996b), Tables C, L and F. 
GDP (real). 
Source: OECD (1 997b), Annex Table 1. 
, 
Note: ALMP = APC + APS + Public employment services and administration. 
Active Labour Market Policles (human capital) (APC): 
APC = (ALMPhe/U) / (GDP/Pop) 
ALMPhc: expenditures on active labour market programmes related to labour market training and 
youth measures. 
SOllrces; OECD (1988 and I 996b), Tables 3.1 and T 
Active Labour Market Policies (subsidies) (APS): 
APS = (ALMPsJU) / (GDPlPop) 
ALMPs: expenditures on active labour market programmes related to subsidised unemployment and 
measures for the disabled. 
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SOllrces: OECD (1988 and 1996b), Tables 3.1 and T 
Union Density (UD): percentage ofworkers who are memhers oftrade unions. 
Source: OECD (1997a), Table 3.3. 
Co-ordination (CO); index based on co-ordination in wage bargaining, on the part of both unions and 
em~lo~ers .. It is ranked lTom 2 to 6, taking into aceount that the degree of union and employer eo-
ordmatlon 15 ranked from a low of 1 to a high of3. 
.'laurce: OECD (1997a), Table 3.3. 
Centralisation (CE): degree of centralisation ofwage bargaining. It is ranked from 1 (decentralised) to 3 
(centralised). 
.'lource: OECD (1997a), Table 3.3. 
Payrol! Tax Rate (PTR): ratio of labour eosts to Average Produetion Workers eaminos. Tot~! labou~ e0.st5 indude social 5ecuri~ contributions and other indireet costs paid by employers and 
SOCial contrlhutlOns and taxes on pay levled on employees. 
.'lource: NiekeJl (1997), Table 5. 
Total Tax Rate (TTR): sum of the average payroll, income and eonsumption tax rates. 
Sources: OECD (1 995a), Table 2.1. And Niekell (1997), Table 5 
Change in Inflation (1): percentage changes from previous period (consumer prices). 
Source: OECD (1 997b), Annex Table 16. 
Cycle (DI, D2): two dummies for 1983-88 and 1989-94 
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